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Out-of-domain Detection for Natural Language
Understanding in Dialog Systems
Yinhe Zheng, Guanyi Chen, Minlie Huang
Abstract—Natural Language Understanding (NLU) is a vital
component of dialogue systems, and its ability to detect Out-of-
Domain (OOD) inputs is critical in practical applications, since
the acceptance of the OOD input that is unsupported by the
current system may lead to catastrophic failure. However, most
existing OOD detection methods rely heavily on manually labeled
OOD samples and cannot take full advantage of unlabeled data.
This limits the feasibility of these models in practical applications.
In this paper, we propose a novel model to generate high-
quality pseudo OOD samples that are akin to IN-Domain (IND)
input utterances, and thereby improves the performance of OOD
detection. To this end, an autoencoder is trained to map an
input utterance into a latent code. and the codes of IND and
OOD samples are trained to be indistinguishable by utilizing
a generative adversarial network. To provide more supervision
signals, an auxiliary classifier is introduced to regularize the
generated OOD samples to have indistinguishable intent labels.
Experiments show that these pseudo OOD samples generated by
our model can be used to effectively improve OOD detection in
NLU. Besides, we also demonstrate that the effectiveness of these
pseudo OOD data can be further improved by efficiently utilizing
unlabeled data.
Index Terms—Natural language understanding, Out-of-domain
detection, Dialogue system, Text classification.
I. INTRODUCTION
NATURAL Language Understanding (NLU) in dialog sys-tems such as task-oriented dialog systems and intelligent
personal assistants is vital for understanding users’ input to
make effective human-machine interaction. A NLU module
maps unstructured text inputs to structured dialog acts, and has
a crucial influence on the downstream processing pipelines of
a dialog system. Therefore, the reliability of NLU becomes
a precursor for the success of dialog systems. Recently,
various deep neural network based NLU models are proposed
and some of these models have been applied in real-world
applications [1]–[3].
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Most existing neural NLU modules are built by following
a closed-world assumption [4], [5], i.e, the data used in
the training and testing phrase are drawn from the same
distribution. However, such an assumption is commonly vi-
olated in practical systems that are deployed in a dynamic
or open environment. Specifically, practical NLU modules
often encounter out-of-domain (OOD) inputs that are not
supported by the system and thus not observed in the training
data. Wrongly accepting these inputs and executing undesired
commands may trigger catastrophic failures, particularly in
risk-sensitive applications where safety is the top priority, such
as robots or self-driving cars. In order to address this issue,
a more realistic assumption of open-world [4], [5] has been
proposed. A NLU system built under this assumption should
be able to not only correctly analyze in-domain (IND) inputs
but also reliably reject OOD inputs that are not supported by
the system.
Various methods have been proposed to improve the OOD
detection performance of neural NLU models [6]–[10], and
most of them follow a threshold-based protocol. Specifically,
a detection score is computed for each input, and then a
threshold is selected using a validation set. The inputs whose
scores are lower than the threshold are considered to be OOD
inputs and then rejected. A simple yet efficient approach is
to use the maximum value of the Softmax output as the
detection score [11], which has been demonstrated to work
surprisingly well on the image classification tasks [12], and
thus has been applied in many state-of-the-art systems [12],
[13]. Further developments in this direction propose to add an
extra entropy regularization (ER) term in the training objective,
and significant performance improvement for OOD detection
is reported when this ER term is optimized using a set of OOD
data [14], [15].
However, collecting large-scale OOD data is usually diffi-
cult and expensive in practice, especially when dealing with
the ever changing open-world environment. This limits the
feasibility of the ER technique in practical applications. To
address this issue, some studies [14], [16] are proposed to
generate pseudo OOD samples with a generative adversarial
network (GAN) [17]. These generated samples can be used to
optimize the ER term and thus improve the OOD detection
performance. However, existing approaches only work in con-
tinuous space (such as generating OOD images or continuous
feature vectors), whereas the input to NLU modules is usually
a sequence of discrete tokens. It is yet to be explored to
generate pseudo OOD samples in discrete spaces (like natural
language) that can be effectively utilized to improve the
OOD detection performance. Moreover, unlabeled data (i.e., a
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mixture of IND and OOD samples) are usually easier to obtain
in practical applications (e.g., through user logs), but rarely
utilized in existing OOD detection methods. It is attractive to
take advantage of these unlabeled data to improve the OOD
detection performance, since we can expect to gain some prior
knowledge about the testing OOD distribution through these
unlabeled data.
In this paper, we study how generated pseudo OOD samples
and unlabeled data can facilitate OOD detection in NLU
systems. We follow the simple and efficient approach to add
an ER term in the training objective, but we focus more on
the way of generating high-quality pseudo OOD samples to
effectively optimize this term. To this end, we propose a novel
pseudo OOD sample generation model (POG) (depicted in
Figure 1).
The proposed model POG consists of three components: 1)
a reconstruction module; 2) an adversarial generation module;
and 3) an auxiliary classifier. In the reconstruction module, an
encoder maps a text input into a latent code, and a decoder
reconstructs the text from the latent code. A generator is then
trained to produce fake latent codes, and a discriminator is
trained to distinguish these fake codes from the real ones
with an adversarial training process. To provide more super-
vision signals, an auxiliary classifier is further introduced to
predict the correct labels associated with the reconstructed
samples and to regularize the generated OOD samples to
have indistinguishable labels. Experiments show that the OOD
samples generated using our model can effectively improve
the performance of OOD detection. We also demonstrate that
unlabeled data can be used to train the reconstruction module
and thus boost the effectiveness of the generated pseudo OOD
samples.
To summarize, our contributions are in three folds:
1) We propose a novel model to generate pseudo OOD
samples. The model consists of an autoencoder, an ad-
versarial training component, and an auxiliary classifier.
The generated samples can be used to effectively improve
the OOD detection performance of NLU by optimizing
the entropy regularization (ER) term in the training stage.
2) The proposed model can take advantage of unlabeled data
to improve the effectiveness of the generated OOD sam-
ples. This makes our model more suitable for practical
applications.
3) We evaluate the model on two datasets and results show
that our model can significantly outperform other com-
petitive baselines for OOD detection.
II. RELATED WORK
The problem of OOD detection has been investigated in
many contexts with different alias, such as “anomaly de-
tection” [15], “one-class classification” [18], [19], “open-set
recognition” [20], or “novelty detection” [21]. Significant
results have been achieved by conventional methods in low-
dimensional spaces [19], [22], and some of these methods have
also been applied to NLU systems [23], [24].
Some recent neural models use only IND data for OOD
detection. Most of these methods follow the threshold-based
protocol, and various approaches for calculating the detection
scores are devised. Popular approaches include modeling
the probability density [8], [25], computing reconstruction
losses [7], [26], [27], using classifier ensembles [13], [28], ap-
plying Bayesian models [29], relying on distances to nearest-
neighbors [9], [30], or even explicitly learning a detection
score [31]. Some KNN-based methods are also applied to
handle text inputs [32], [33]. However, most of these methods
are computationally expensive either in training or inference,
and cannot take full advantage of unlabeled data to improve
the OOD detection performance. Some of these methods also
require a tremendous amount of memories as the number
of classes increases [33]. All these disadvantages limit the
feasibility of these methods in practical applications.
Another type of neural based OOD detection models aims to
utilize a set of OOD data in the training phrase. Specifically,
a special “OOD” label is added in a binary or multi-class
classifier (e.g., [34]), and the inputs that fall into this special
“OOD” class is rejected. However, the feasibility of this naive
approach is limited in practice since suitable OOD data are
usually hard to collect, and incorporating too many irrelevant
OOD samples in training may cause a serious issue of data
imbalance. Further, the OOD distribution is usually too broad
to capture with these limited OOD data.
Our study is also related to a large amount of works on
controllable text generation [35]–[37], some of which also
involve an adversarial training process [38], [39] and controls
the generated content. However, most previous studies for
controllable text generation aim to model a smooth rep-
resentation space and produce fluent utterances within the
data distribution, whereas our model targets at improving the
OOD detection performance of an NLU system and tries to
generate effective OOD samples that are not in the given data
distribution.
Another branch of related studies is the Positive and
Unlabeled (PU) learning [40], in which a learning algorithm
has only access to positive examples and unlabeled data. The
difference between our study and PU learning models is that
we aims to reject all samples that are not from IND classes.
There is no guarantee that the unlabeled data can cover the
entire OOD distribution, which is usually too large to tackle.
However, the negative distribution considered in PU learning
models is assumed to be completely covered by the unlabeled
data.
There are two closely relevant studies from Ryu et al. [16]
and Lee et al. [14]. These studies utilize a GAN based
generator to produce OOD samples when building the OOD
detector. The major difference between our study and these
works is that we focus on generating discrete token sequences,
whereas previous works can only generate samples in the
continuous space (e.g., images or continuous feature vectors).
Moreover, our model can also utilize unlabeled data to improve
the OOD detection performance, while previous works only
use IND data.
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III. MODEL
A. Task Definition
In this study, we aim at improving the OOD detection
performance of a practical NLU module in a dialogue system.
We focus on the intent classification task since it is the most
important role of a NLU module. These OOD inputs that are
not supported by the current system are rejected once they are
detected in the intent classification process.
Our task can be formally defined as below: Given a set
of IND data, which are drawn independently from an IND
distribution Pind, i.e,
Dind = {(x1, y1), · · · , (xn, yn)} ∼ Pind,
and a set of unlabeled data, which are either drawn from the
IND distribution Pind or the OOD distribution Pood, i.e.,
Dmix = {xˆ1, · · · , xˆn} ∼ Pind or Pood,
where xi and xˆi represent utterances, and yi ∈ {l1, · · · , lm} is
xi’s label (i.e., intent type). We aim to build an intent classifier
which can (1) reject the input x if x is drawn from Pood, and
(2) predict the correct intent type of x if it is from Pind.
Note that in most cases, Pood is not known or its underlying
space is too large to explore. We cannot expect to capture the
entire Pood with the limited OOD data sampled from Dmix.
However, we can expect to gain some prior knowledge about
the OOD distribution with the help of Dmix to improve the
performance of OOD detection.
B. Classifier with Entropy Regularization
In this study, the threshold based approach is used for de-
tecting OOD inputs. Similar to the method introduced in [11],
we use the maximum value of the Softmax output as the OOD
detection score. Specifically, the intent classifier is built with
a Softmax output layer to predict an m-dimension distribution
Pθ(y|x) for each input utterance x:
Pθ(y|x) = [Pθ(y = l1|x), Pθ(y = l2|x), · · · , Pθ(y = lm|x)]
The detection score for x is obtained by:
Score(x) = max
i∈{1,2,...,m}
Pθ(y = li|x) (1)
where θ denotes the parameters of the classifier, and m is the
number of intent types in the NLU module.
In order to determine whether an input utterance x is from
Pind or Pood, a threshold t is chosen (usually based on the
validation set). The input x is regarded as an IND sample and
further processed by the system if Score(x) ≤ t, otherwise
it is determined to be an OOD sample and thus rejected by
the system. Therefore, it is desirable for IND inputs to obtain
higher detection scores, while OOD inputs to obtain lower
detection scores.
Usually, the intent classifier is trained by minimizing the
cross entropy loss:
Lce(θ) = E
(xi,yi)∼Pind
[−logPθ(y = yi|xi)] (2)
Minimizing Lce(θ) on Dind enforces the classifier to produce
confident predictions on IND samples, which leads to high
detection score. However, neural models trained based on the
cross entropy loss tend to be overconfident [41], which results
in the fact that samples from Pood may also receive a high
detection score [12]. This makes the IND and OOD inputs
indistinguishable with the detection scores. To address this
issue, a regularization term can be added to enforce a high
entropy for the samples from Pood, i.e.,
Lent(θ) = E
xˆ∼Pood
[−H(Pθ(y|xˆ))] (3)
where H is the Shannon entropy of the predicted distribution.
This term is similar to the confidence loss used in [14] as it
enforces the predicted distribution of OOD inputs closer to the
uniform distribution, and thus leads to lower detection scores
for OOD inputs.
The total loss for the intent classifier is
Lcls(θ) = Lce(θ) + αLent(θ) (4)
where α is a hyper-parameter to balance the contribution of
the entropy regularization term. In this study, we set α = 11.
Note that in the original work of [15], Lent(θ) is optimized
with samples drawn from Pood. Ideally, we should sample all
types of OOD inputs if we cannot obtain any prior knowledge
for Pood. However, this is often infeasible, if not impossible,
in practical applications. We thus propose to tackle this issue
with a pseudo OOD sample generation module which will be
detailed in the next section.
C. Pseudo OOD Sample Generation
In this section, we present a novel pseudo OOD sample
generation (POG) model which employs an adversarial gener-
ation process. The produced pseudo OOD samples can be used
to evaluate the entropy regularization term Lent(θ), thereby
improving the performance of OOD detection.
1) Model Overview: The overall architecture of the pro-
posed POG model is shown in Figure 1. Three major com-
ponents are included: 1) an autoencoder; 2) an adversarial
generation module and 3) an auxiliary classifier.
The idea of generating effective pseudo OOD samples
originates from the observation that most OOD samples look
similar to IND inputs (share same phrases or patterns) but do
not correspond to any IND intents. Such OOD samples are
usually harder to detect, and more efficient for improving the
OOD detection performance if they are used to optimize the
ER term [14]. Therefore, in this study, we use the autoencoder
to map an input utterance x into a latent code z, and use the
adversarial generation module to imitate the real latent code
z with a fake one z˜. In this way, the generated utterance x˜′
will look similar to the reconstructed utterance x′. Further,
the auxiliary classifier is trained to predict the correct intent
label associated with the reconstructed utterance x′ and used to
regularize the latent code generator to make sure the generated
utterance x˜′ to have indistinguishable intent labels and thus
being OOD.
Each component is detailed below.
1We also tried other values for α, but the experiments show that the final
result is not sensitive to this value.
IEEE/ACM TRANSACTIONS 4
Encoder
Encథ
Generator
𝐺క
Discriminator
𝐷ఎ
Decoder
Decట
Decoder
Decట
Auxiliary Classifier
ACఠ
Shared 
Parameters
Shared 
Parameters
Auxiliary Classifier
ACఠ
Fig. 1. Overall architecture of the pseudo OOD sample generation (POG) model. An encoder Encφ transforms an input utterance x to a latent code z. A
decoder Decψ reconstructs x′ from z. A generator Gξ is built to map a Gaussian noise to a fake latent code z˜ and a discriminator Dη distinguishes the fake
code z˜ and the real code z with an adversarial training process. An auxiliary classifier ACω is trained to predict the correct label associated with x′, and Gξ
is regularized by the gradients derived from ACω which enforces utterance x˜′ generated from z˜ to follow an uniform distribution.
2) Autoencoder: This component contains two functions:
An encoder Encφ (parameterized by φ) that maps an input
utterance x to a latent code z, i.e.,
z = Encφ(x),
and an decoder Pψ(x|z) (parameterized by ψ) that reconstructs
an utterance x′ out of z. The autoencoder is trained by
minimizing the reconstruction loss:
Lrec(φ, ψ) = E
∼N (0,I)
E
x∼Pind
[− logPψ(x|z + )]
= E
∼N (0,I)
E
x∼Pind
[− logPψ(x|Encφ(x) + )]
(5)
Note that in order to smooth the latent space, we add a
Gaussian noise  ∼ N (0, I) to z before feeding it to the
decoder in the training phrase. This approach is reported to
be effective for smoothing the produced latent space of an
autoencoder [38].
3) Adversarial Generation Module: This component uses
an adversarial training process to approximate the latent codes
corresponding to the IND data. Two functions are involved: a
generator Gξ which maps a noise  ∼ N to a latent code z˜,
i.e.,
z˜ = Gξ(),
and a discriminator Dη which distinguishes the real latent code
z from the generated latent code z˜. Intuitively, the generator
aims to fool the discriminator while the discriminator aims to
discriminate real codes from generated ones.
In this study, we train our generator and discriminator
by minimizing the Wasserstein-1 distance [42] between the
generated distribution and the data distribution. Specifically,
the loss for the generator is
Lg(ξ) = E
∼N
[−Dη(Gξ()] (6)
whereas the loss for the discriminator is:
Ld(η) = E
∼N
[Dη(Gξ()]− E
x∼Pind
[Dη(Encφ(x))] (7)
In order to enforce the 1-Lipschitz constraint [42] on the
discriminator Dη , we employ the gradient penalty term as
proposed in [43]:
Lgp(η) = E
xˆ∼Pxˆ
[(‖∇xˆDη(xˆ)‖2 − 1)2] (8)
where the sampling process from Pxˆ is approximated by
uniformly interpolating between two random samples, one
from the data distribution and another from the generated
distribution [43].
4) Auxiliary Classifier: This component of our model maps
a decoded utterance to an m-dimension label distribution,
where m is the number of IND intent labels. Specifically, the
parameters ω of the auxiliary classifier (AC) Pω(y|x′) are
optimized with the cross entropy loss to predict the correct
intent label associated with the “real” utterance x′ (i.e., x′ is
decoded based on a real latent code z, that is, ∃x ∼ Pind, s.t.
z = Encφ(x) and x′ ∼ Pψ(x|z)):
L′ce(ω) = E
(xi,yi)∼Pind,
x′∼Pψ(x|Encφ(xi))
[−logPω(y = yi|x′)] (9)
Further, we use the AC to guide our latent code generator Gξ
to produce latent codes that can be decoded into OOD samples.
Specifically, we use the following loss for Gξ to enforce a high
entropy for the predicted distribution of the AC on the “fake”
utterance x˜′ (i.e. x˜′ is decoded based on a fake latent code,
that is, ∃ ∼ N , s.t. z˜ = Gξ() and x˜′ ∼ Pψ(x|z˜)):
L′ent(ξ) = E
∼N ,
x˜′∼Pψ(x|Gξ())
[−H(Pω(y|x˜′))] (10)
where y denotes the intent type space.
Note that the latent code generator Gξ trained using the loss
Lg(ξ) and L′ent(ξ) is trying to accomplish two adversarial
targets: First, the adversarial loss Lg(ξ) forces the generated
latent code to be close to the IND space, and thus makes
the decoded utterance x˜′ looks similar to utterances in Dind;
Second, the regularization loss L′ent(ξ) ensures the intent
associated with the decoded utterance x˜′ cannot be predicted
by the AC. Specifically, L′ent(ξ) reaches its minimum when
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Algorithm 1 Training Procedure of POG
1: for each training iteration do
/* (1) Train the autoencoder (Encφ, Decψ)
and the auxiliary classifier (ACω) */
2: Sample {xi, yi}Mi=1 ∼ Dind
3: Compute zi = Encφ(xi), i = 1, · · · ,M
4: Add Gaussian noise zi ←− zi + ,  ∼ N (0, I)
5: Update φ, ψ by minimizing Lrec(φ, ψ)
6: Decode x′i ∼ Pψ(x|zi)
7: Update ω by minimizing L′ce(ω)
/* (2) Train the discriminator (Dη) */
8: Sample {xi, yi}Mi=1 ∼ Dind, {i}Mi=1 ∼ N
9: Compute zi = Encφ(xi), and z˜i = Gξ(i)
10: Update η by minimizing Ld(η) + Lgp(η)
/* (3) Train the generator (Gξ) */
11: Sample {i}Mi=1 ∼ N
12: Compute z˜i = Gξ(i)
13: Update ξ by minimizing Lg(ξ)
14: Decode x˜′i ∼ Pψ(x|z˜i)
15: Update ξ by minimizing L′ent(ξ)
16: end for
the AC produces a uniform distribution, namely, x˜′ does not
belong to any existing intent labels. It is expected that these
losses can guide our model to generate OOD samples near
the IND distribution (i.e., look similar to the IND samples),
thereby making the model more effective in OOD detection.
The training process of the POG model is detailed in
Algorithm 1. Note that the text sample x˜′i which is decoded
in Step 14 of Algorithm 1 is discrete and non-differentiable,
which hinders the gradients back-propagating from the AC
to the generator Gξ through the loss L′ent(ξ) in Step 15 . In
order to address this issue, we use a continuous approximation
approach to replace the token (i.e., one-hot vector) sampled at
each time step in x˜′i (in Step 14) and x
′
i (in Step 6) with the
probability vector produced by the decoder Pψ(x|z). These
“soft” tokens are fed into the AC to make the whole computa-
tion process differentiable. Specifically, the word embedding
fed at each time step of the AC is computed as an average over
all the word embeddings weighted by the input probability
distribution. Moreover, we also applied the temperature scaling
technique to sharp the output distribution, i.e., the logits in
each time step are divided by a temperature t to produce the
output distribution. In our experiments, the value of t anneals
from 1 to 0 as the training proceeds. This sharpens the output
distribution to make it close to a one-hot vector.
D. Utilizing Unlabeled Data
It is observed in previous studies that if the OOD data
used in the training and testing phrase are similar, the OOD
detection performance is better [14], [15]. However, using
human labeled OOD data in Eq. 3 is expensive and it is hard
for the POG model to gain any prior knowledge about the
testing OOD samples if only IND data is utilized. However,
fortunately, the unlabeled data Dmix, which are usually easier
to collect, can help us to solve this issue.
Algorithm 2 Training Procedure of AEPOG
1: Each training iteration additionally:
/* (1b) Train the autoencoder (Encφ, Decψ) */
2: Sample {xˆi}Mi=1 ∼ Dmix
3: Compute zi = Encφ(xˆi), i = 1, · · · ,M
4: Add Gaussian noise zi ←− zi + ,  ∼ N (0, I)
5: Update φ, ψ by minimizing Lrec(φ, ψ)
/* (2b) Train the discriminator (Dη) */
6: Sample {xˆi}Mi=1 ∼ Dmix, {i}Mi=1 ∼ N
7: Compute zi = Encφ(xˆi), and z˜i = Gξ(i)
8: Update η by minimizing Ld(η) + Lgp(η)
In this study, we augment the training process of the
autoencoder in POG with the data from Dmix. It is expected
that the latent space produced by the autoencoder will be
enriched with OOD samples and the AC will lead the generator
to focus on these OOD samples in the adversarial training
process. Specifically, this involves adding a few additional
steps in Algorithm 1, in particular, two steps are added in
each training iteration: (1b) update φ, ψ with the reconstruction
loss and (2b) update η with the discriminator loss utilizing the
data sampled from Dmix. We denote the augmented model as
AEPOG, and the corresponding training algorithm is shown
in Algorithm 2. Experiments in Section IV demonstrate that
the generated pseudo OOD utterances can be more effective
at improving the OOD detection performance.
IV. EXPERIMENT
A. Dataset
We evaluated the proposed model on two datasets:
1) OSQ dataset [44]: this dataset covers 150 IND intents
and also provides a set of manually labeled Out-of-Scope
Queries (OSQ) that are not supported by the current
system. These out-of-scope queries are regarded as OOD
data in our experiments.
2) IPA dataset: this dataset contains a set of Chinese
utterances that were collected and annotated in the devel-
opment process of a commercialized Intelligent Personal
Assistant (IPA) named Bixby2. This dataset covers 1,310
intents. 310 intents are randomly selected as the OOD in-
tents, and the corresponding utterances are used as OOD
data. The remaining 1000 IND intents are grouped into
67 domains based on their functions, and then 67 class
labels are used for these IND data in our experiments to
alleviate the data imbalance issue.
The IND data were divided into the train, validation, and
test sets. The OOD data were only used for validation and
test.
In addition to the labeled data, some unlabeled data (i.e.,
a mixture of IND and OOD data) Dmix were also collected
for the AEPOG model. Specifically, for the OSQ dataset, a
mixture of 10K IND data and 250 OOD data were used as
Dmix, and for the IPA dataset, 20K unlabeled utterances were
2Bixby is shipped with a large number of Samsung products, such as
phones, refrigerators, or watches.
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TABLE I
STATISTICS OF THE OSQ AND IPA DATASETS. Dmix DENOTES A
MIXTURE OF IND AND OOD DATA.
Train Validate Test
OSQ
Dataset
IND 15.00K 3.00K 4.50K
OOD - 0.10K 1.00K
Dmix 10.25K - -
IPA
Dataset
IND 28.90K 3.60K 3.60K
OOD - 1.20K 1.20K
Dmix 20.00K - -
TABLE II
OOD DETECTION PERFORMANCE ON THE OSQ DATASET. EACH RESULT
IN THIS TABLE IS AN AVERAGE OF TEN DIFFERENT RUNS. THE NOTATION ↑
MEANS HIGHER VALUES ARE BETTER, AND ↓ MEANS LOWER VALUES ARE
BETTER. THE MODEL ER+AEPOG IS SIGNIFICANTLY BETTER THAN
OTHER MODEL WITH p-VALUE < 0.01 (†) AND p-VALUE < 0.05 (∗)
(USING T-TEST)
Model AUROC↑ AUPR↑ FPR95↓ FPR90↓
Cont. GAN 52.22† 82.79† 94.40† 88.17†
Maha. Dis. 67.14† 90.56† 91.94† 83.30†
Likelihood Ratio 85.60† 96.07† 62.50† 43.40†
AE 87.78† 96.98† 58.50† 40.10†
MSP 92.86† 98.24† 39.72† 21.76†
Entropy 92.82† 98.87† 31.91† 19.64†
KNN 93.33† 98.20† 33.86† 18.78†
DOC 94.24† 98.55† 30.02† 14.94†
ODIN 95.14∗ 98.84∗ 26.04∗ 11.70†
ER+Perturb 94.01† 98.55† 34.04† 15.32†
ER+Mix 93.48† 98.31† 33.16† 17.86†
ER+POG 95.41∗ 98.94∗ 25.00∗ 10.10†
ER+AEPOG 95.83 99.05 23.70 9.50
extracted from user logs and used as Dmix. The statistics of
the data used in our experiment is shown in Table I.
B. Model Implementation
Our text classifier was implemented using the CNN archi-
tecture [45]. Four kernel sizes (2, 3, 4, 5) were used and each
kernel had 128 feature maps. A three-layer MLP was added on
top of the CNN feature, and the hidden size of each layer was
512. Pre-trained word embeddings are used, and the classifier
was trained for 30 epochs.
For the POG model, the auxiliary classifier shared the
same structure and hyper-parameter setting with the text
classifier. The encoder and decoder were both implemented
using LSTM [46]. The hidden size of the LSTM used for
the OSQ and IPA datasets was 100 and 256, respectively.
The generator and discriminator were both four-layer MLPs
activated with the Leaky ReLU function [47]. The hidden size
of the MLP was of 512 and 1024, respectively for the OSQ
and IPA dataset. The vocabulary size was of 1.7K and 7.3K for
the OSQ and IPA dataset, respectively. The POG and AEPOG
models were trained for 80 epochs.
C. Baselines
In this work, we used several threshold-based OOD detec-
tors as baselines. These baselines differ mainly in the way to
calculate detection scores.
1) MSP [11]: A text classifier with a Softmax output layer is
trained, and the maximum Softmax output is used as the
detection score (i.e., calculated using Eq. 1). The training
objective of this classifier does not include the entropy
regularization (ER) term.
2) Entropy: The Shannon entropy of the predicted distribu-
tion for each input is used as the detection score. A higher
entropy means higher uncertainty of the prediction, which
indicates that the input sample may be from the OOD
data.
3) ODIN [12]: The temperature scaling and input perturba-
tion technique is applied to the text classifier as obtained
in the previous MSP baseline, and the maximum Softmax
output is used as the detection score. Note that small
perturbations of each input are added to the last feature
layer in this baseline.
4) DOC [28]: m binary classifiers are built for m classes.
The maximum confidence score predicted by these m
classifiers is used as the detection score.
5) KNN: The feature for each input sample is extracted us-
ing a pre-trained classifier (i.e., the classifier as obtained
in the previous MSP baseline), and the Euclid distance
of each feature vector to its nearest class is used as the
detection score.
6) Maha. Dis. [48]: The Mahalanobis distance is used to
replace the Euclid distance in the previous KNN baseline.
7) Cont. GAN [16]: A GAN-based model is trained to
generate continuous OOD features to mimic features ex-
tracted from IND samples. The confidence of the discrim-
inator is used as the detection score. A low confidence
score suggests the input sample may be from the OOD
data.
8) AE: An autoencoder is trained on the IND data, and the
reconstruction error of each input is used as the detection
score.
9) Likelihood Ratio [9]: The likelihood ratio is used as the
detection score. The background model is trained using
perturbed IND samples, which are generated by randomly
replacing tokens in the IND samples with a probability
of 0.53.
10) ER+Perturb: An ER term Lent(θ) (Eq. 3) is added to
the training objective of the classifier, and this term is
optimized using perturbed IND samples. These perturbed
samples are constructed in a similar way as in the
previous Likelihood Ratio baseline.
11) ER+Mix: The ER term in the training objective is opti-
mized using the data from Dmix. This baseline demon-
strates a naive way to utilize Dmix.
Our baselines cover a variety of competitive OOD detection
models that are currently available. Note that the text classifier
involved in each baseline follows the same structure and
hyper-parameter setting with our classification model (see
Section IV-B), and the baseline AE and Likelihood Ratio
share the same LSTM structure with our POG model.
3Other probability values were also tested, but similar results were obtained
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TABLE III
OOD DETECTION PERFORMANCE ON THE IPA DATASET. EACH RESULT IN
THIS TABLE IS AN AVERAGE OF TEN DIFFERENT RUNS. THE NOTATION ↑
MEANS HIGHER VALUES ARE BETTER, AND ↓ MEANS LOWER VALUES ARE
BETTER. THE MODEL ER+AEPOG IS SIGNIFICANTLY BETTER THAN
OTHER MODEL WITH p-VALUE < 0.01 (MARKED BY †) AND p-VALUE <
0.05 (∗) USING T-TEST
Model AUROC↑ AUPR↑ FPR95↓ FPR90↓
Cont. GAN 58.06† 80.47† 91.51† 85.05†
Maha. Dis. 45.65† 23.45† 95.01† 89.97†
Likelihood Ratio 69.65† 86.21† 84.44† 74.46†
AE 67.57† 85.91† 86.77† 74.79†
MSP 72.66† 86.42† 77.79† 86.42†
Entropy 72.87† 86.42† 88.15† 75.41†
KNN 67.94† 82.62† 76.87† 63.43†
DOC 71.68† 46.03† 79.40† 64.34†
ODIN 72.90† 86.53† 77.57† 63.28†
ER+Perturb 73.24† 86.89∗ 77.88† 63.30†
ER+Mix 33.71† 63.55† 96.44† 92.33†
ER+POG 73.83† 87.15∗ 76.17† 62.28†
ER+AEPOG 75.86 87.95 71.67 56.78
D. Metrics
For OOD detection, we used three common metrics [9],
[11], [14], [15]:
1) AUROC. The area under the receiver operating
characteristic (ROC) curve; Higher values are better.
2) AUPR. The area under the precision-recall curve when
OOD inputs are treated as the positive samples; Higher
values are better.
3) FPRN . The false positive rate (FPR) when the true
positive rate (TPR) is N%4. In this study, FPR95 and
FPR90 are reported, since such settings are commonly
used in practical systems. Lower values are better.
Note that the metric FPRN is of more practical value in
real-world applications since it evaluates the performance of an
OOD detection module at a particular threshold. It is directly
related to the performance of a deployed system. Lower FPRN
means triggering fewer false alarms when the performance
on the IND data is guaranteed with a precision of N% [15].
On the contrary, the metrics AUPR and AUROC evaluate the
performance across various thresholds. In other words, AUPR
and AUROC are threshold independent.
E. Effects of Generated Pseudo OOD Utterances
First of all, we evaluated the effectiveness of the pseudo
OOD utterances generated by our model POG when only IND
data is available. More concretely, the POG model was trained
and, meanwhile, a set of pseudo OOD utterances (with the
same size of the IND training data) was sampled to optimize
the ER term Lent(θ) (i.e., Eq. 3). The performance of the
resulting model (i.e., ER+POG) on the OSQ and IPA dataset
is depicted in Table II and Table III, respectively.
4Note that FPR= FP
FP+TN
, and TPR= TP
TP+FN
, where FP, TP, TN, FN is
the number of false positives, true positives, true negatives, false negatives,
respectively.
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Fig. 2. ROC curves for the models on the IPA dataset. The model ER+AEPOG
improves the AUROC of OOD detection compared to AEPOG, whereas a
sharp decrease for the AUROC of OOD detection is observed for the model
ER+Mix, which directly utilizeDmix to optimize the ER term of the classifier.
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Fig. 3. ROC curves for the models on the OSQ dataset. We zooms in the
upper-left corner of the ROC curves to facilitate a clearer view.
It can be seen that our model outperforms all the base-
lines on both datasets significantly, which demonstrates the
effectiveness of the generated pseudo OOD utterances. It is
also interesting to see that: 1) Detecting OOD samples on the
IPA dataset is more difficult compared to the OSQ dataset.
This is because that most OOD inputs in the IPA dataset look
similar to the IND inputs since they all come from the similar
domains. Further, the fact that the proposed model ER+POG
surpasses all the baselines on both dataset also proves its
ability to handle various kinds of inputs with different dis-
tributions. 2) The proposed ER+POG model obtains large
improvements on the FPRN metrics. In particular, the relative
performance gain for FPR95 and FPR90 on the OSQ dataset
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TABLE IV
CLASSIFICATION ACCURACY ON IND INPUTS FOR EACH MODEL. EACH
RESULT IN THIS TABLE IS AN AVERAGE OF TEN DIFFERENT RUNS.
Model OSQ Dataset IPA Dataset
Cont. GAN 70.43 84.68
Maha. Dis. 82.36 89.73
MSP 92.61 91.19
KNN 81.05 88.32
DOC 91.84 89.20
ER+Perturb 90.96 91.22
ER+Mix 89.77 90.41
ER+POG 93.31 91.37
ER+AEPOG 93.32 91.40
reaches 4.16% and 15.84%, respectively, compared to the best
performing baselines. Even on the more difficult IPA dataset,
the relative performance gain also reaches 0.92% and 1.61%
for FPR95 and FPR90, respectively. This indicates that the
proposed model is more suitable in real-world applications
since the metric FPRN directly reflects the performance of
the deployed models. 3) The Cont. GAN baseline proposed in
[16] only performs slightly better than random guess. This
shows that using GAN to generate continuous features for
OOD samples is not helpful to improve the OOD detection
performance, and the discriminator learned in the adversarial
training process cannot be directly used as the OOD detector.
It is also worth mentioning that there is no side effect to the
performance of the NLU model on IND inputs if we optimize
the ER term with utterances generated by the proposed model.
In particular, as shown in Table IV, the utterances generated
by the proposed model even help to improve the classification
accuracy of the NLU module on IND inputs. The performance
of both the ER+POG and ER+AEPOG model surpass other
baselines on both datasets in Table IV. This may be because
optimizing the ER term with utterances produced by the POG
or AEPOG model helps to prevent the classifier from over-
fitting, and it further demonstrates the effectiveness of the
proposed model in practical applications.
F. Effects of Utilizing Unlabeled Data
We also verified the effectiveness of our model when a set
of unlabeled data Dmix is available. Specifically, an AEPOG
model was trained by optimizing Lrec(φ, ψ) with the data
from Dmix (Algorithm 2), and the sampled pseudo OOD
utterances were used to optimize Lent(θ) when training the
intent classifier. The performance of the resulting classifier on
the OSQ and IPA datasets is shown in the last line of Table II
and Table III, respectively.
It can be seen that the model ER+AEPOG surpasses all the
other models significantly, especially on the FPRN metric.
Particularly, on the OSQ dataset, the performance of the
ER+AEPOG model improves 9.87% and 23.16% (relatively)
compared to the best performing baselines on FPR95 and
FPR90, respectively, and on the IPA dataset, the perfor-
mance improves 7.26% and 11.45% (relatively) for FPR95
and FPR90, respectively. This verifies our claim that the
proposed AEPOG model can effectively utilize unlabeled data
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Fig. 4. Distributions of detection scores corresponding to the IND and OOD
samples of the OSQ dataset.
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Fig. 5. Distributions of detection scores corresponding to the IND and OOD
samples of the IPA dataset.
to improve the effectiveness of the generated OOD samples,
and thus it is more suitable in practical applications.
It is also interesting to see that the baseline model ER+Mix,
which optimizes the ER term Lent(θ) directly using the
data from Dmix when training the classifier, experiences a
remarkable performance drop on all metrics, especially on the
IPA dataset (see Figure 2). This indicates that the ER term
itself cannot utilize Dmix directly. It further demonstrates that
the performance improvement obtained by the ER+AEPOG
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model attributes to the proposed AEPOG model, since the
proposed adversarial training process helps to produce more
effective pseudo OOD samples to improve the OOD detection
performance.
Figure 3 shows the ROC curves obtained from these models
on the OSQ dataset. The proposed ER+POG model surpasses
all the baselines, and ER+AEPOG further improves the per-
formance of OOD detection. Similar results are also obtained
on the IPA dataset (see Figure 2). Note that the performance
improvement of the ER+AEPOG model over the ER+POG
model is relatively small on the OSQ dataset compared to
the IPA dataset. This is partly because the OOD data only
take a small proportion (i.e., 2.44%) of Dmix in the OSQ
dataset, whereas about one third (33.33%) intents are randomly
selected as OOD in the IPA dataset.
We also analyzed the distribution of the detection scores
obtained from different models on the OSQ and IPA datasets.
Specifically, for the MSP model, the distributions correspond-
ing to IND and OOD inputs are closely overlapped (see
Figure 4a and Figure 5a). Marginal improvements are observed
for the model ER+Perturb, which optimizes the ER term using
randomly perturbed IND inputs (Figure 4b and Figure 5b).
This indicates that the ER term helps to improve the OOD
detection performance, but only to a limited extent. Better
separation of the detection scores between the IND and OOD
inputs is observed when the ER term is optimized with
the pseudo OOD utterances generated by the POG model
(Figure 4c and Figure 5c), and this separation is enlarged if the
utterances generated by the AEPOG model are used (Figure 4d
and Figure 5d). This indicates that the pseudo OOD utterances
generated by the proposed model facilitate OOD detection,
and the effectiveness of these pseudo OOD utterances can be
further improved when utilizing the unlabeled data.
G. Feature Vectors for IND and OOD Inputs
To further investigate the benefit of the proposed model on
OOD detection, we visualized the feature spaces of different
intent classifiers on the OSQ dataset (see Figure 6). Specifi-
cally, we fed the test samples of the OSQ dataset to each intent
classifier and obtained the feature vector of each sample from
the penultimate layer of the network. The t-SNE algorithm [49]
was used to map these vectors into 2-dimensions.
It can be seen that all the intent classifiers cluster features
of the IND samples into separated groups. This coincides
with the observation that all models obtain high classification
performance on IND inputs (Table IV). However, as to the
OOD samples, the MSP model scatters the features of OOD
samples around the features of IND samples (Figure 6a),
making it hard for OOD detection. Whereas, the classifiers
that are regularized by the ER term produce more distinguish-
able features for IND and OOD samples (Figure 6b), and
the utterances generated by the proposed POG and AEPOG
model enhance this separation (Figure 6c and Figure 6d). This
facilitates the detection of OOD inputs.
H. Case Study for Generated OOD Utterances
Table V shows some randomly selected cases of the pseudo
OOD utterances generated by the proposed POG and AEPOG
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Fig. 6. t-SNE visualization of the features vectors associated with the test
samples from the OSQ dataset.
TABLE V
UTTERANCES SAMPLED FROM THE IND AND OOD TEST SET OF THE OSQ
DATASET (I.E., HUMAN GENERATED UTTERANCES), AND THE PSEUDO
OOD UTTERANCES GENERATED USING THE POG AND AEPOG MODEL.
IND Samples
Translate hello in French.
Locate my phone please.
Schedule a gas bill payment.
Help me change my insurance plan.
I’d like to improve my credit score.
OOD Samples
How much is my car worth used.
Can you add a bag to my reservation.
How do you fix a leaking sink.
How long do wire transfer take.
When was Toyota created.
Generated by POG
Please obtain French.
How can make my phone get.
What meetings can I schedule there.
Can you help me an setting.
I’d like to include the email my my dinner.
Generated by AEPOG
How much is this payments please.
How good is my reservation like.
How do you divided for pork.
Tell me how long I taken for chilis off.
When was today’s name with delta vehicle.
model on the OSQ dataset. It is interesting to see that the POG
model can combine words and phrases from the IND samples
(such as “French” or “my phone”) in a grammatical way,
and thus makes the produced pseudo OOD utterances look
similar to the IND data but possess indistinguishable intents.
Moreover, the AEPOG model can make use of phrases from
the OOD data, and thus produces more effective utterances
that can be used to improve the OOD detection performance.
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V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we propose a novel model POG to generate
pseudo OOD samples that can be used to improve the perfor-
mance of OOD detection in a NLU module. An autoencoder
is used to map each input utterance to a latent code and an
adversarial training process is employed to make the codes of
OOD samples similar to those of IND samples. This makes
the generated OOD samples look similar to IND samples.
Further, an auxiliary classifier is introduced to regularize the
generator, and thereby ensures these generated pseudo OOD
samples to have indistinguishable intents. Our experiments
show that the pseudo OOD samples generated by the proposed
POG model can be used to effectively improve the OOD
detection performance of the NLU module by optimizing
the ER term when training the NLU module. Further, it is
also demonstrated that augmenting the training process of the
autoencoder in the POG model improves the effectiveness of
the generated pseudo OOD samples.
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